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Board	directors	are	supposed	to	have	broad
knowledge,	but	are	they	also	narrow	experts?
We	all	know	about	the	experts	who	know	so	much	about	so	little,	and	so	little	about	so	much.	Scientists	and	artists
are	prime	examples	of	specialised	occupations	whose	members	are	suspected	of	being	impractical	in	daily	life.
Managers,	on	the	other	hand,	are	supposed	to	have	broad	and	practical	knowledge,	and	to	be	flexible	in	what	they
do.	These	are	stereotypes,	of	course,	so	they	are	a	mix	of	truth	and	falsehood.	A	good	way	to	understand	the	mix	is
to	look	at	the	central	governance	of	firms	–	the	board	of	directors	–	which	is	supposed	to	represent	all	stockholders
and	to	help	the	firm	through	their	wide	knowledge.	Directors	are	supposed	to	have	even	broader	knowledge	than
managers.	But	are	they	also	narrow	experts?
Our	recent	paper	looked	at	this	question	using	data	on	how	Chinese	firms	made	acquisitions	during	the	market
reform	that	started	in	the	1980s	and	accelerated	in	the	1990s.	This	was	the	time	when	the	state	was	strongly
encouraging	all	firms,	state-owned	or	private,	to	become	efficient,	market	oriented,	and	profitable,	to	grow	the
Chinese	economy.	Acquisitions	were	a	frequently	used	tool	to	accomplish	that	because	many	firms	had	problems
that	could	be	solved	through	combining	them.
It	was	a	great	opportunity	for	market-oriented	firms	to	acquire	less	efficient	firms	and	improve	their	operations.	In
many	cases,	improving	operations	also	meant	that	they	needed	fewer	workers	and	would	fire	many	of	them,	contrary
to	what	they	did	before	the	market	reform,	when	they	would	try	to	maintain	employment	even	if	it	led	to	lower
performance.
But	there	was	also	one	more	form	of	acquisition.	The	state	(local	or	central)	sometimes	played	matchmaker	between
firms	in	order	to	rescue	weaker	firms.	These	rescues	did	not	mean	to	make	them	more	profitable.	They	were	meant
to	avoid	the	search	for	efficiency	gains	that	could	leave	workers	unemployed.
Firms	reacted	differently	to	the	different	acquisition	opportunities	they	had,	because	they	could	ignore	the	state’s
matchmaking	and	pursue	market	acquisitions,	like	a	free-market	firm.	Or,	they	could	agree	to	the	matchmaking	and
avoid	market	acquisitions,	like	a	state-owned	firm.	These	decisions	were	made	by	the	board	of	directors,	who	are
supposed	to	do	what’s	best	for	the	firm,	regardless	of	the	director’s	background.
That’s	not	what	happened.	Director	background	decides	the	director	experience,	and	the	director	experience	decides
what	the	director	wants	to	do	and	is	good	at	doing.
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Firms	had	directors	with	both	market	economy	and	state	experience	in	different	proportions.	Our	research	showed
that	the	directors	ended	up	splitting	the	board	into	coalitions	battling	to	make	the	type	of	acquisition	that	best
matched	their	experience,	so	when	a	firm	had	many	directors	with	state	experience	the	firm	ended	up	making	more
of	the	state’s	matchmaking	acquisitions.
Ironically,	that	was	against	the	current	state	policy	of	market	reform,	so	it	meant	that	directors	were	following	their
experience,	not	state	instructions.	Boards	with	directors	who	had	more	market-economy	experience	made	more
market	acquisitions,	even	if	the	firms	were	state	owned.	These	directors	were	among	the	leaders	in	implementing	the
market	reform.
Did	it	matter	who	owned	the	firm?	Yes	it	did,	and	in	the	way	you	would	expect.	More	state	ownership	made	the	firm
more	likely	to	agree	to	state	matchmaking.	But	ownership	and	board	membership	worked	differently	in	these	firms.
Less	state	ownership	made	firms	less	likely	to	agree	to	matchmaking	no	matter	what.	When	the	firm	had	fewer	board
members	with	state	experience	it	was	more	responsive	to	performance	when	deciding	their	acquisition	strategy.	This
is	what	we	should	expect,	because	a	director	with	market	experience	sees	acquisitions	as	ways	to	solve	problems
and	pursue	opportunities.	For	a	director	with	state	experience,	acquisitions	are	simply	risky	things	to	do	unless	they
are	the	result	of	state	matchmaking.	These	are	different	ways	of	thinking	about	a	very	important	strategic	action,	and
they	come	from	the	ways	that	experience	shapes	thinking.
Experience	gives	expertise	but	also	blinders.	When	the	experience	of	directors	influences	their	actions	strongly,	the
result	is	often	politics	to	create	a	winning	coalition.	This	means	that	the	board	of	directors	is	important	in	more	ways
than	we	thought	before,	because	a	director	with	narrow	and	deep	experience	may	end	up	as	an	advocate	of
following	that	experience,	even	if	it	does	not	fit	the	needs	of	the	firm.	Owners	beware.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	authors’	paper	Dominant	Coalitions	Directing	Acquisitions:	Different	Decision
Makers,	Different	Decisions,	Academy	of	Management	Journal,	2018,	forthcoming.
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	author,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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